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ABSTRACT 
The South African government has set as a policy objective the halving of poverty by 2014, although 
the meaning of this goal has not yet been defined. This article frames government’s stated target of 
halving poverty by 2014 in terms of specific measures of the poverty gap and poverty headcount 
ratio, using newly released income and expenditure survey data. With the poverty line as defined 
here, approximately half the South African population falls below the poverty line. Despite this, the 
aggregate poverty gap is surprisingly only about 3% of GDP. Projections of poverty in 2014 under 
various growth scenarios indicate that growth alone will be insufficient to halve poverty by that 
time, and that any worsening of distribution will put the target of halving poverty by 2014 beyond 
reach. However, projecting the effects of a range of growth and distributional scenarios indicate 
that halving poverty appears feasible with moderate growth rates and fairly mild pro-poor 
distributional change. The results are indicative as to the scale of distributional changes necessary 
to halve poverty under various growth scenarios.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Poverty remains very high in South Africa. Over 10% of people in South Africa live on less than 
$1 a day, whereas countries with similar levels of income per capita as South Africa (such as 
Chile, Turkey, Malaysia, or Costa Rica) typically have less than 2% of their population below the 
$1 a day line, and even comparable countries such as Brazil have less than 10% of people below 
this line. Over a third of South Africans fall below the $2 a day line, whereas in comparable 
countries typically between 10 and 20% of the population falls below this line.2 Unsurprisingly, 
inequality in South Africa is extremely high by international standards, with a Gini coefficient of 
0.67.3 
The United Nations Millennium Declaration includes a commitment to halve extreme poverty 
between 2000 and 2015, measured in terms of the proportion of people living below $1 per 
day. The South African government has targeted the halving of poverty by 2014, although 
exactly what this means in economic terms is yet to be elaborated and a national poverty line is 
still being developed, in terms of which government’s target is to be framed.  
This study takes as a starting point the target of halving poverty by 2014, as set out in the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (AsgiSA) strategy announced by the 
South African government in 2006.4 We use the most recently available income and 
expenditure data to measure current levels of poverty, and thus to quantify what the halving of 
poverty would actually mean. This allows for an evaluation of the feasibility of halving poverty 
by 2014. The intention in this article is thus not to comment on the intrinsic merit of halving 
poverty as a public policy objective. Rather, it is to concretise this objective in economic terms, 
to assess its feasibility, and to analyse under what growth and distributional scenarios the 
                                                 
2
 International poverty rates in this paragraph sourced from World Bank (2005). 
3
 In terms of household per capita expenditure. 
4
 This economic policy framework, under the auspices of the South African Presidency, has as its key pillars the 
expansion of public infrastructure investment; sectoral development strategies to promote private investment; a 
drive to improve education and skills; measures to integrate marginalised parts of the population into the 
mainstream economy; improved macroeconomic management; and enhancing public administration and policy 
implementation. 
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target could be achieved. Growth can potentially play an important role in reducing poverty, 
and we evaluate how far growth might reasonably go towards halving poverty. 
The analysis has important policy implications. The South African government is currently in the 
process of unpacking what the target of halving poverty means, and this research is thus 
directly relevant to policy-makers as well as to economists concerned with issues of distribution 
and poverty. The projections presented here of poverty under various growth/distributional 
scenarios have clear analytical and policy implications. Furthermore, since no research has yet 
been published measuring poverty using the most recently available data, this contribution is 
important in bringing to light the current state of poverty in South Africa.  
The existing literature points to an increase in poverty in South Africa between 1995 and 2000, 
with the possibility of some reduction thereafter. Hoogeveen and Özler (2005) using a 
normative poverty line of R322 per month find that the poverty headcount ratio remains at 
about 58% between 1995 and 2000. However, using lower poverty lines (such as $1 or $2 per 
day) they find significant increases in poverty and especially in extreme poverty. Hoogeveen 
and Özler characterise growth between 1995 and 2000 as not being pro-poor either absolutely 
or relatively, as real income growth of the poor was actually negative and was below mean real 
income growth. 
Leibbrandt et al (2004) find a slight worsening of income poverty between 1996 and 2001, 
especially for Africans. Simkins (2004) uses several measures of poverty and determines that 
poverty unambiguously rose between 1995 and 2000. A similar conclusion is drawn by Pauw 
and Mncube (2007) using the same datasets. Meth and Dias (2004) find that poverty worsened 
in South Africa between 1999 and 2002, with up to 4.5 million additional people falling below a 
subsistence-based poverty line, although the increased intensity of poverty is mitigated if the 
‘social wage’ is factored in. Ardington et al (2005) test the robustness of the general finding in 
the literature that poverty increased between 1996 and 2001 to various aspects of the datasets 
(such as missing data), and their results confirm that poverty did indeed rise.     
Van der Berg et al (2005) using unofficial data (a marketing survey) observe a slight worsening 
in poverty between 1995 and 2000, but a decline in poverty between 2000 and 2004. The UNDP 
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(2003) finds a small reduction in the poverty headcount ratio between 1995 and 2002. A review 
recently put out by the South African government (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 
2008) points to declines in both the poverty gap and the poverty headcount ratio between 1995 
and 2005, and attributes this decline primarily to government’s social welfare grants.  
The generally unimpressive record of income poverty reduction since the advent of democracy 
in South Africa highlights the challenge of significantly cutting poverty. Countries such as Chile 
and to a lesser extent Brazil have made significant progress in reducing poverty in recent years, 
through dedicated programmes centred around targeting spending on the poor. Halving 
poverty by 2014 in South Africa, as per government’s commitment, would arguably require a 
significant shift given the apparent stubbornness of poverty levels thusfar. 
Section 2 of this paper quantifies what the ‘halving of poverty’ could mean, by setting out a 
monetary poverty line, clarifying two relevant measures of poverty, and by using the latest 
income and expenditure survey data to put figures to the target of halving poverty. Section 3 
projects the poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap in 2014 under various growth scenarios, 
considering specifically whether poverty can be halved through growth under the current 
distributions of income and expenditure. In Section 4 we project various scenarios of equalising 
distributional change, and discuss the poverty outcomes under a range of growth/distributional 
combinations. This article does not model the causal relationship between growth and 
distribution, but rather looks at the effects of various combinations of growth and distributional 
change on poverty. Section 5 concludes. 
2. FRAMING THE ‘HALVING OF POVERTY’ TARGET 
a) Data 
We utilise the various datasets of the 2005/2006 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES). These 
are the official national household surveys produced by the national statistical agency, Statistics 
South Africa (hereafter Stats SA).5 All data were inflated or deflated to March 2006 (depending 
on when the household was surveyed), using monthly CPI data. Both income and 
                                                 
5
 The original datasets were accessed through the South African Data Archive of the National Research Foundation.  
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expenditure/consumption are shown in initial analysis, but we subsequently focus on 
expenditure/consumption since this is most relevant to poverty.6 All calculations were 
undertaken on a household per capita basis, as elaborated further below. 
b) The poverty line 
AsgiSA does not define precisely what is meant by ‘poverty’ and hence what a ‘halving of 
poverty’ would actually mean. The Minister of Finance announced in his 2005 Budget Speech 
that a poverty line would be developed for South Africa. A process has since been underway, 
led by National Treasury and Stats SA, to develop a national poverty line. This line is expected to 
be finalised by the end of 2008, according to Stats SA. The official government targets for 
halving poverty are then to be framed in terms of that line.   
We therefore use the proposals contained in the official Stats SA/National Treasury Discussion 
Document (2007) to derive an appropriate line for this study. Stats SA calculates a food poverty 
line at R211 [$31]7 per capita per month (in 2000 prices). This is intended to represent the 
minimum amount required to purchase enough food to meet an average person’s basic daily 
food-energy requirements over a month.8 Stats SA then estimates the non-food component of 
                                                 
6
 In line with Stats SA definitions and international best guidelines (see for instance United Nations University 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (2008)), expenditure/consumption has been calculated to 
include the following categories: food and beverages; tobacco and narcotics; clothing and footwear; housing, 
water, electricity, gas and other fuels; furnishings, household equipment and routine maintenance of the house; 
health; transport; communication; recreation and culture; education; restaurants and hotels; miscellaneous goods 
and services (which includes personal care; personal effects; social protection services; insurance; other financial 
services); and other services not elsewhere classified. Income has been calculated to include the following broad 
categories: income from work; income from capital; pensions, social insurance, family allowances; income from 
other individuals; other income; and income from imputed rent on owned dwelling (calculated as 7% of the value 
of the dwelling per annum). Not included in either income or expenditure are the estimated values of in-kind 
income or expenditure respectively; savings, debts, taxes, transfers made to others; loss incurred in obtaining 
income; and other products not consumption (such as interest on mortgage bonds; non-refundable bursaries; and 
the imputed costs of home production).  
7
 The conversion of figures from South African Rands to US$ in this article uses 2006 exchange rates for 
consistency, since the analysis is based on 2006 data. 
8
 This measure is based on the daily energy requirement of 2 261 kilocalories per capita, as recommended by the 
South African Medical Research Council. Stats SA then calculated the cost of meeting this minimum energy 
requirement, in the light of the types of foods commonly available to low-income South Africans, using the 2000 
IES. 
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a poverty line as R111 [$17] per capita per month.9 This yields a total poverty line of R322 [$48] 
per capita per month in 2000 prices.  
The $2 a day measure of poverty that is commonly used internationally translates to about 
R162 per capita per month in 2000 prices (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2006). This is about half of 
the minimum poverty line which Stats SA calculates, and is significantly below even the 
essential food component of the poverty line calculated as being necessary to meet minimum 
daily energy requirements. The $2 poverty line has been widely criticised (see for example 
Reddy and Pogge, 2008). 
Stats SA bases the household poverty threshold on a pooling of resources within households, 
with equal weighting given to all members of the household (i.e. without using any adult 
equivalence conversions, economies of scale, or other scaling). In other words, the poverty 
threshold for a household of five people would simply be [5 x R322 = R1610 per month] (in 
2000 prices). We follow this approach in calculating poverty on a household per capita basis. It 
might be considered more appropriate to apply some form of equivalence scaling, such as a 
factor for ‘converting’ children to their adult equivalents and taking account of intra-household 
economies of scale. However, the nutritional basis for the poverty line is calculated on a per 
capita basis (as opposed to an adult equivalent basis) and hence the conversion of household 
income or expenditure into household per capita income or expenditure needs to be consistent 
with this. 
Drawing on the Statistics SA/National Treasury Discussion Document as well as discussions on 
the issue with Stats SA officials involved in the process, this study uses as a basis the lower 
poverty line suggested in the Discussion Document (R322 per capita per month in 2000 prices). 
We are not necessarily of the view that this is the most appropriate measure for a poverty line, 
but defining a poverty line is not the focus of this study.  
                                                 
9
 This calculation is based on the assumption that the non-food items that are typically purchased by a household 
that spends about R211 per capita per month on food can be treated as essential, as such households are 
effectively forgoing food consumption in order to purchase these non-food items. Note that the overall poverty 
line is approximately one-and-a-half times the food poverty line. In Latin American countries, the poverty line is 
typically defined as double the food poverty line.   
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The R322 baseline needs to be inflated from 2000 prices to March 2006 levels for use with the 
2005/6 IES data in the analysis that follows. Stats SA inflates the 2000 figures using the CPI 
index for metropolitan areas only. This is clearly problematic, particularly given the rural bias of 
poverty in South Africa. Further, given that CPI rates for the lower income quintiles tend to 
exceed those for the higher quintiles, the use of an overall CPI measure is inappropriate for 
inflating a measure which is relevant to people living in poverty, if the intention is to cost the 
same basic basket of goods deemed necessary in 2000.     
In order to construct an appropriate inflator index, this study thus uses the CPI rates for the 
lowest two quintiles for all areas (metropolitan, other urban, and rural) in order to inflate the 
2000 poverty line to March 2006 prices. We take the mean of these CPI rates for the lowest and 
second-lowest quintiles given that these are most relevant to the basket of goods consumed by 
the poor.  
The use of this inflator indices results in the poverty line of R322 in 2000 prices being converted 
to a line of R450.48 [$67] in March 2006 prices (as opposed to R422.46 when the overall CPI for 
urban areas is used)10. We use March 2006 as this is the month to which the 2005/06 figures 
are calibrated. The baseline poverty line used in the analysis which follows is thus R450 [$67] 
per capita per month (or R5 400 [$800] per capita per annum) in March 2006 prices. 
In some parts of the analysis we also look at the effects of using the ‘food poverty line’ as 
calculated by Stats SA. This includes only the food items needed to meet minimum energy 
requirements, and excludes the costs of clothing, shelter, transport, and so on. This was 
calculated by Stats SA at R211 per capita per month (in 2000 prices) which translates to R295 
[$44] per month in March 2006, for use with the 2005/6 IES data. 
c) Measuring poverty 
Setting the level of a monetary poverty line answers only part of how to gauge poverty, and 
hence how to define what halving poverty would mean. One way of measuring poverty is the 
                                                 
10
 The line would convert to R555.15 [$82] in 2008 prices (utilising the inflation rates up to an including June). 
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poverty headcount ratio11, and this is the measure that government seems inclined to use to 
quantify poverty.  
The poverty headcount ratio measures the incidence of poverty, which is an important 
dimension of poverty. The simplicity of this measure may make it intuitively appealing from a 
policy perspective. However, the poverty headcount ratio gives no indication of the intensity of 
poverty. The actual incomes of all the people falling below the poverty line do not enter into 
the poverty headcount ratio in any way.  
The intensity of poverty can appropriately be measured not by the poverty headcount ratio but 
by the aggregate poverty gap, which sums the gaps between the poverty line and the income or 
expenditure of everyone falling below the poverty line. 12   
The choice of poverty measure has significant policy implications, particularly insofar as specific 
targets for the reduction of poverty are part of government policy. The purpose of a ‘target’ is 
not only to evaluate outcomes but to inform policy design and implementation. The poorest 
people are highly unlikely to be lifted above the poverty line in the near future, and any 
increase in their incomes will have no impact on the poverty headcount ratio. To the extent 
that success in poverty reduction is measured exclusively in terms of the poverty headcount 
ratio, this could de-emphasise raising the incomes of the poorest people. This is particularly 
important when, as will be seen below, about half of South Africans can be classified as poor. 
Measuring the halving of poverty solely in terms of the poverty headcount ratio could imply a 
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 The poverty headcount ratio H is the proportion of the population falling below the poverty line, and can be 
formally expressed as ∑
=
=
n
1i
pi )y|y(g
n
1
H  where there are n individuals with expenditures or incomes iy  arranged 
in ascending order such that n21 y...yy0 ≤≤≤≤ . The poverty line can be denoted by py and let 
;yy|1)y|y(g pipi <=  pipi yy|0)y|y(g ≥= . The poverty headcount ratio is typically expressed in percentage 
form, 100H, showing the percentage of the population falling below the poverty line. The incidence of poverty can 
also be measured simply as a poverty headcount (i.e. the actual number of people falling below the poverty line, 
rather than as a proportion of the population). However this is less desirable than a ratio since it gives a less 
meaningful sense of the extent of poverty, and population changes can also obscure the interpretation of changes 
over time.  
12
 Using the same notation as in the previous footnote, the poverty gap G can be formally expressed as ∑
=
=
n
1i
igG  
where )0,yymax{g ipi −= . 
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focus on the second quartile of the population (i.e. the second quarter from the bottom of the 
population) and not the poorest quartile. 
Given the important shortcomings of the poverty headcount ratio, and the information about 
the intensity of poverty conveyed by the aggregate poverty gap, it seems advisable that the 
AsgiSA target of halving poverty be framed not only in terms of halving the poverty headcount 
ratio but also in terms of halving the poverty gap. While this formulation may lose some of the 
appealing simplicity of using only the poverty headcount ratio, it seems justified by a more 
comprehensive standard of measure. In the analysis that follows we use this dual measure of 
the ‘halving of poverty’, in terms of halving both the poverty headcount ratio and the aggregate 
poverty gap. 
d) Framing the AsgiSA target of halving poverty 
We have specified a monetary poverty line for the purposes of this analysis13, and argued for 
the measurement of poverty in terms of both the poverty headcount ratio and the aggregate 
poverty gap. Finally, concretising the meaning of halving of poverty by 2014 requires the 
specification of a starting point. AsgiSA was however formally launched in February 2006. We 
use the 2005/06 IES data (which are indexed to March 2006) as the baseline and analyse the 
halving of poverty from there.  
Using a baseline poverty line of R450 [$67] per capita per month yields a poverty headcount 
ratio of 52.45% (using expenditure) and 49.56% (using income) in 2006. In other words, roughly 
half of South Africans fall below this poverty line. The aggregate poverty gap comes out at just 
under R60 billion [$8.9 billion] (R59.65b using income, and R59.82 using expenditure). This is 
only about 3% of GDP.14 
                                                 
13
 A full analysis of poverty would of course need to take into account the various monetary and non-monetary 
dimensions of poverty. These include not only the absolute level of income of expenditure, but also relative 
poverty, the meeting of basic needs, human dignity, and capabilities. The use of a monetary poverty line in the 
analysis that follows is not intended to undermine the importance of these aspects. However, the use of a specific 
line is necessary for the type of empirical analysis of the relationship between growth, distribution, and poverty 
undertaken here. 
14
 With the food poverty line of R295 [$44] per month, the poverty headcount ratio would be 34.36% and the 
poverty gap R21 billion [$3.1] using expenditure; 33.86% and R22.3 billion [$3.3 billion] using income. Double the 
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Given that both the income and expenditure poverty headcount ratios are in the region of 50%, 
we can approximate the ‘halving of poverty’ target as involving the following two components: 
• Cutting the poverty headcount ratio to 25% of the population by 2014; 
• Reducing the aggregate poverty gap to R30 billion
15
 [$4.4 billion] by 2014.  
 
The analysis of the relationship between distribution, growth, and poverty that follows is based 
on how these targets can be achieved. The actual policies that could be implemented to 
address poverty or change distribution fall outside of the scope of this article. Rather, the focus 
is on what the commitment in AsgiSA to halving poverty means in terms of growth and 
distribution, and under what growth/distributional scenarios these targets can be achieved. 
3. CAN POVERTY BE HALVED THROUGH GROWTH? 
We begin by analysing whether the AsgiSA target of halving poverty can be achieved through 
distributionally neutral growth. This is done by applying various growth rates uniformly across 
each of the 47 391 192 individuals in the (weighted) dataset. 
Since the poverty line is a monetary poverty line based on the cost of a basket of goods, it 
remains constant in real terms. This means that, with any positive growth, there will be 
reductions in the poverty gap and headcount ratio, so long as there is not a worsening of 
distribution affecting the bottom half of the population.  
AsgiSA sets GDP growth targets of at least 4.5% between 2005 and 2009, and at least 6% 
between 2010 and 2014. We consider how poverty would evolve by 2014 with these rates and 
the current distributional structure. However, these rates are targets and not projections or 
forecasts. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that these rates will actually materialise, particularly 
in the light of the global economic problems.  
                                                                                                                                                             
food poverty line – which is a poverty measure commonly used in Latin American countries in particular – yields a 
poverty headcount ratio of 62.27% and a poverty gap of R105.7 billion [$15.8] using expenditure; or 57.94% and 
R102.7 billion [$15.3 billion] using income. 
15
 In March 2006 Rands. 
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We thus also use two sets of growth forecasts. Firstly, government’s growth forecasts16 for the 
years 2008-2010, combined with the actual growth rate for 2007. Since official forecasts for 
2011 onwards are not available for the years 2011-2014 inclusive, we utilise the mean of 
Treasury’s growth forecasts for the period 2008-2010, as the most recently available official 
growth forecasts. Secondly, we use the growth forecasts put out by the major private banks in 
South Africa.17 The most recent forecasts put out by ABSA, FNB, Nedbank, and Standard Bank 
for the period 2008-2010 are averaged on an annual basis, and the average of this measure is 
used for subsequent years.  
The annualised growth rates derived from these three sources (the AsgiSA targets, the National 
Treasury forecasts, and the forecasts by the private banks) are summarised in Table 1 below.18  
Table 1: Growth forecasts 2006-2014 
 Total growth  Average annualised growth 
AsgiSA 52.71 5.43 
National Treasury 40.67 4.36 
Banks 33.58 3.69 
 
For comparison purposes, GDP in South Africa grew at an average annualised rate of 4.3% 
between 2000 and 2007 (3.6% per annum between 1994 and 2007).19 These rates were 
reached during the recent commodities boom from which South Africa benefited, and which is 
unlikely to continue in the near future. The recent downturn in the world economy, which is 
also affecting South Africa, will in all probability result in a decline in growth rates. This would of 
course make it even more difficult to attain the poverty targets than is shown here.   
These three different growth rates are applied uniformly across the distribution to ascertain the 
effects on poverty.20 Note that this only means that people gain uniformly in proportionate 
                                                 
16
 As contained in the 2008 Budget (National Treasury, 2008). 
17
 See ABSA (2008), Bruggemans (2008), Nedbank (2008), and Standard Bank (2008). 
18
 We later look a wider range of growth scenarios ranging between 3% and 7% per annum. 
19
 Derived from GDP data published by the South African Reserve Bank, downloaded from www.reservebank.co.za. 
20
 Note that these initial distributionally-neutral simulations of the effects of alternative growth rates on poverty 
are based on a uniform expansion of all incomes and expenditures, not only those derived directly from earnings 
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terms; in absolute terms the wealthy of course gain many times more than the poor with a 
uniform growth rate.  
Tables 2 and 3 show what the halving of poverty would mean in terms of the poverty 
headcount ratio and aggregate poverty gap. Tables 4 and 5 thereafter show the same using the 
food poverty line. These results are shown in terms of each of expenditure and income, but in 
the subsequent analysis we focus on expenditure since this is most directly relevant to 
measuring poverty. In each case the poverty gap and headcount ratio in 2014 are projected 
under three growth scenarios (using AsgiSA targets, Treasury forecasts, and the banks’ 
forecasts), given the current distribution of income or expenditure. In other words, this shows 
how far growth alone would take us towards meeting the targets of halving poverty, under the 
current distributional structure. 
Even with the growth rates targeted in AsgiSA, neither the poverty gap nor the poverty 
headcount ratio can be halved with the current distribution of income or expenditure. Growth 
at the AsgiSA targeted rates would make significant inroads into poverty – cutting the poverty 
headcount ratio by about a third and the poverty gap by around 45%. Even with the food 
poverty line, growth at the rates targeted in AsgiSA would result in halving the poverty gap but 
not the poverty headcount ratio. If actual growth between now and 2014 is closer to the rates 
forecast by Treasury and by the banks, the proportion of people living under either poverty line 
is cut considerably but by far less than half.   
                                                                                                                                                             
from employment. This implicitly assumes a continuation and commensurate expansion in non-earnings sources of 
income (such as social grants), which might not be considered to derive from ‘growth’ alone in a narrow sense. 
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Table 2: Poverty projections under alternative growth scenarios - Expenditure 
 Poverty headcount ratio 
(%) 
Poverty gap (R billion) 
2006 actual 52.46 59.82 
Target: halving poverty  26.23 29.91 
   
Growth scenarios to 2014:   
AsgiSA targets  34.33 32.00 
Treasury projections  38.00 36.77 
Banks projections  40.14 39.95 
Note: 
The poverty gap in 2006 of +R60bn is equivalent to +$8.9 billion, which is about 3% of South Africa’s GDP. 
 
Table 3: Poverty projections under alternative growth scenarios - Income 
 Poverty headcount ratio 
(%) 
Poverty gap (R billion) 
2006 actual 49.57 59.65 
Target: halving poverty  24.79 29.83 
   
Growth scenarios to 2014:   
AsgiSA targets  33.75 33.98 
Treasury projections  36.99 38.44 
Banks projections  39.06 41.41 
 
 
Table 4: Poverty projections [using food poverty line] under alternative growth scenarios – 
Expenditure 
 Poverty headcount ratio 
(%) 
Poverty gap (R billion) 
2006 actual 34.36 21.02 
Target: halving poverty  17.18 10.51 
   
Growth scenarios to 2014:   
AsgiSA targets  17.52 8.76 
Treasury projections  20.46 10.58 
Banks projections  22.51 11.87 
 
 14 
Table 5: Poverty projections [using food poverty line] under alternative growth scenarios – 
Income 
 Poverty headcount ratio 
(%) 
Poverty gap (R billion) 
2006 actual 33.86 22.31 
Target: halving poverty  16.93 11.16 
   
Growth scenarios to 2014:   
AsgiSA targets  18.57 10.57 
Treasury projections  21.45 12.37 
Banks projections  23.19 13.63 
 
It can be safely concluded that it is highly unlikely that poverty can be halved through growth 
alone. This means that poverty will not be halved by 2014 in the absence of some form of pro-
poor distributional change.   
These results show the effects of alternative growth rates on poverty if distribution is 
unchanged; were distribution to worsen then fewer people would be lifted out of poverty at 
any of these growth rates. 
We use TIP curves to show both the poverty gap and poverty headcount ratio under the current 
distributions of income and expenditure, and subsequently to explore the relationship between 
distribution, poverty, and growth and specifically to assess what combinations of growth and 
distributional change would allow for the halving of the poverty gap and poverty headcount 
ratio. Derived from Jenkins and Lambert (1997), ‘TIP’ refers to the ‘Three I’s of Poverty’: the 
incidence, intensity, and inequality of poverty. TIP curves plot the cumulative sum of the 
poverty gaps per capita (y-axis) against the cumulative population share (x-axis).  
Formally the TIP curve can be denoted (following Jenkins and Lambert) as TIP(g; p) where p is 
the cumulative population share with 1p0 ≤≤  and p on the x-axis is plotted against ∑
=
k
1i
i
n
g
. Thus 
∑
=
=
k
1i
i
n
g
)
n
k
;g(TIP  for nk ≤  (with intermediate points derived through linear interpolation). 
The slope of the TIP curve at any given percentile equals the poverty gap for that percentile. For 
the subset of the population falling below the poverty line, the TIP curve is an increasing 
concave function of p, while for people above the poverty line the curve is horizontal (since 
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their poverty gaps are zero). Insofar as the curve flattens as it approaches the poverty line, this 
shows the decline in the poverty gap as expenditure or income increase towards the threshold.  
The extent of poverty incidence, in terms of the poverty headcount ratio, is shown by the value 
of p at the point where the curve becomes horizontal. This is shown by the length of the non-
horizontal part of the TIP curve.  
The intensity of poverty is shown by the overall height of the TIP curve, since the height of the 
curve (at p=1) is the aggregate poverty gap averaged over the entire population. The average 
poverty gap amongst the population falling below the poverty line is given by the slope of a ray 
from the origin to (h, TIP(g; h)).  
The degree of inequality amongst the poor is shown by the degree of concavity of the non-
horizontal section of the TIP curve. If all of the poor had equal incomes then the non-horizontal 
section of the curve would be a diagonal straight line (with a gradient equalling the difference 
between the poverty line and the average income of the poor).  
Figure 1 shows the TIP curve for current expenditure (on a household per capita basis, per 
month). The picture is similar in the case of income, but we focus on expenditure here. The 
curve plots over 47 million individual points, the cumulative poverty gaps of every South African 
(weighted from the original survey data). 
It can be seen that about half of the population currently falls under the poverty line of R450 
per capita per month. Halving the poverty headcount ratio would mean cutting it to about a 
quarter. This target for the headcount ratio is shown by the dotted vertical line at around 0.26. 
The mean poverty gap per capita over the whole population is about R105 per capita per 
month. Halving the poverty gap would mean bringing it down to about R53 per capita, and this 
target is shown by the horizontal dashed line. Meeting the targets of halving both the poverty 
gap and the poverty headcount ratio would mean bringing the point of the TIP curve at which it 
becomes flat below the horizontal dotted line as well as to the left of the vertical dotted line. 
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Figure 1: TIP curve of expenditure  
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Note: Poverty line set at R450 per capita per month, as discussed in the text (Figures 1-4). 
 
In Figure 2 below the original TIP curve for expenditure is compared with that which would 
result if the growth rates targeted in AsgiSA were to materialise through to 2014, given the 
current distribution of expenditure. The pattern of expenditure that would derive from that is 
shown as a dashed curve. Using the Treasury or banks’ forecasts would yield TIP curves in 
between these two curves, but closer to the AsgiSA curve. 
With the growth rates as hoped for in AsgiSA, the poverty gap is reduced drastically and the 
poverty headcount ratio also falls significantly. Despite this, it can be seen that neither the 
poverty gap nor the poverty headcount ratio is actually halved. Even if the AsgiSA-targeted 
growth rates were to materialise, this would be insufficient to halve poverty without some pro-
poor distributional change (in the sense of distributional change that disproportionately raises 
the income and expenditure of the poor). 
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Figure 2: TIP curve of expenditure and expenditure with AsgiSA targeted growth rate 
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4. POVERTY OUTCOMES UNDER ALTERNATIVE GROWTH/DISTRIBUTIONAL SCENARIOS 
a) Distributional changes 
Having established the improbability of growth alone leading to the halving of poverty by 2014, 
given the current distribution of income and expenditure, we thus examine what growth-
distribution scenarios could produce the result of halving poverty by 2014.  
There is an almost infinite variety of hypothetical distributional changes that could result in a 
halving of poverty. We consider distributional changes across the entire population in the 
scenarios that follow, as explained below. Of course this is not how distributional change occurs 
in practice, and it would be very difficult to design policies to effect these outcomes with any 
degree of precision (and redistributional changes would of course also incur significant 
administrative costs and other types of transaction costs).  
The concern here is not so much a direct redistribution of income through social transfers, 
although this could certainly be a component of distributional change. The analysis is 
concerned more fundamentally with an overall shift in the growth path towards more ‘pro-poor 
growth’ in the sense of growth in which the incomes of the poor increase relatively more than 
do those of the non-poor. The distributional changes simulated here are intended to be 
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indicative of the scale of ‘redistribution’ of incomes and expenditure that would result from a 
more pro-poor growth path. For instance, one in which returns to unskilled labour rose more 
rapidly than returns to skilled labour, and/or a relative expansion in employment opportunities. 
We are not suggesting that such a shift would result in the exact distributional changes 
analysed here. Rather, these projections are indicative in nature and are suggestive as to what 
combinations of growth and a more egalitarian distribution could result in a halving of poverty.  
b) Method for simulating distributional changes 
The methodology used in simulating alternative distributional scenarios is set out below with 
reference to income for heuristic purposes, but these were undertaken with each of income 
and expenditure. The method is explained intuitively here, and mathematically in Appendix 2. 
We begin by ranking the entire South African population from highest to lowest in terms of 
household per capita income. The distributional changes simulated here ‘revolve’ around a 
specific point in the distribution. In the simplest case this is the median income earner. We have 
also used the person at the 66.6 th percentile (i.e. where a third of people have higher incomes) 
and the 75th percentile. This ‘anchor’ point is the only person whose income is unaffected by 
the distributional change.21 Everyone with a higher income than this person loses from the 
distributional change and everyone below that person gains. The extent to which someone 
loses or gains depends on how far they are from the unaffected person: the highest income 
earner loses most while the lowest gains most. The simulated distributional change is generally 
rank-preserving because of the relatively small increments spread continuously over a 
population of over 47 million, with a small number of minor rerankings. 
In the simplest case in which distributional change revolves around the median income earner, 
the change is symmetrical around that point. The loss of the highest income earner is the exact 
gain of the lowest; the loss of the second highest income earner is the gain of the second 
lowest; and so on. In this case the distributional change is both mean-preserving and median-
preserving.  
                                                 
21
 Since weights are being used this is not necessarily an actual individual, but the principle is the same. 
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In a slightly more complex variation, the point around which the distributional change revolves 
is not the median income-earner (i.e. the 50th percentile), but the person at for instance the 
66.6 th or 75th percentile. In these cases the distributional changes simulated are mean-
preserving but not median preserving. If for example the change in the distribution of revolves 
around the 75th percentile, the gain of the bottom three income earners must be matched by 
the loss of the top income earner, the gain of the next three income earners must be matched 
by the loss of the second highest income earner, and so on.  
One parameter of these transformations is the ‘scale’ of the distributional change, in terms of 
how much income is redistributed. The simplest way to think about this is to set by how much 
the income of the lowest earner should grow through the distributional change. We have run 
simulations in which the income or expenditure of the bottom income earner grows by 
amounts ranging between R50 [$7.40] and R300 [$44.4] per month. While this would constitute 
a very significant increase in income for someone at the lowest end of the distribution, the 
negative effect at the top of the distribution is but a miniscule fraction of the income of the 
highest earners.  
For example, in the case of a distributional change in which the income of the lowest-income 
person rises by R50 and the distributional change revolves around the median, the income of 
the highest-income person would decline by R50. The income of the second-lowest-income 
person would rise by just under R50 and that of the second-highest-income by fall by just under 
R50 and so on, with the amounts falling uniformly from both sides until reaching zero at the 
median. In the case of a distributional change of a maximum R50 but revolving around the 75th 
percentile, the income of the lowest-income person rises by R50 while the income of the 
highest-income person declines by R150, with the absolute amounts declining from both ends 
(but in larger increments for the top quarter of the distribution) until reaching zero at the 75th 
percentile. 
An alternative way of modelling distributional changes would have been simply to apply 
different growth rates to different parts of the distribution spectrum – for instance, that the 
income or expenditure of the bottom decile grows at 7%, that of the next decile at 6.5%, and so 
on. However, such a method is much cruder than the one we have employed. The method used 
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here avoids an outcome where the income or expenditure of the person at the top end of the 
bottom decile grows significantly more than that of the person just above them at the bottom 
of the next decile. In our method the growth rates vary not by income category (e.g. deciles) 
but by individual, resulting in a much more continuous distributional change across the 
distributional spectrum.  
Note that the ‘losers’ from the distributional change, at the upper end of the distribution, do 
not actually suffer any net loss of income or expenditure in the scenarios set out below, as we 
combine these simulated distributional changes with various growth scenarios. The income or 
expenditure at the top still grows considerably in every scenario (and far more than other 
people in absolute terms), but slightly less than it would in the absence of the equalising 
distributional change.  
This analysis does not model the causal relationships between growth and distribution. It uses 
micro-data to simulate distributional changes and to combine these changes with various 
growth rates in order to quantify the effects on poverty. 
c) Projected poverty outcomes under various growth/distributional scenarios 
In terms of growth, we consider growth rates averaging between 3% and 7% per annum 
through to 2014.22 While the upper growth scenarios are not at all likely to materialise, they are 
included here for the purposes of comparing various growth/distribution combinations. 
We thus simulate the effects on the poverty gap and headcount ratio of sixty different 
combinations of growth and distributional change, for each of income and expenditure. These 
scenarios combine five alternative growth rates (3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, and 7% annual average 
growth rates through to 2014) with four different ‘intensities’ of pro-poor distributional change 
(in which the income of the lowest-income person rises by R50, R100, R200, or R300) and in 
which distributional change revolves around each of the median, the 66.6 th percentile, and the 
                                                 
22
 We do not report here as to whether distributional change alone could deliver a halving of poverty, as we did 
with growth. It would be unrealistic to make projections based on zero growth between 2006 and 2014 
(particularly as there has already been growth between 2006 and 2008). 
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75th percentile. This allows for a consideration of the effects on poverty of combining growth 
with change in distribution that benefits the poor.  
Poverty outcomes under two such scenarios are shown in Figure 3 for illustrative purposes. The 
solid line shows the expenditure pattern that would result from 6% GDP average growth per 
annum through to 2014, combined with a progressive distributional change in which the 
poorest South African is just R50 better off than they would otherwise have been. The dashed 
line shows a scenario in which growth is fairly low at 3% per annum but there is a more 
intensive distributional change, with the lowest-expenditure person gaining an additional R200 
per month (with decreasing amounts thereafter, as explained earlier). The poverty gap is halved 
in both of these scenarios (as can be seen by the fact that both curves lie below the horizontal 
dotted line). However, while the poverty headcount ratio is reduced in both cases, this is by less 
than half (both curves flatten out a bit to the right of the vertical dotted line). Neither of these 
particular growth/distribution combinations is quite enough to halve the proportion of people 
living below the poverty line. 
Figure 3: TIP curve of expenditure under alternative growth/distribution scenarios 
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Figure 4 shows a growth/distributional scenario in which both the poverty gap and the poverty 
headcount ratio are indeed halved. In this scenario GDP grows at 4% per annum, while in terms 
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of distribution the expenditure of the poorest person is R200 per month higher than would 
otherwise be the case. The TIP curve for this scenario falls well below the horizontal dotted line, 
indicating that the poverty gap is actually cut by much more than half. It flattens out to the left 
of the vertical dotted line, showing that the poverty headcount ratio is cut by at least half. This 
growth/distribution scenario is one in which the AsgiSA target of halving poverty is achieved on 
both counts. Furthermore, it is in the realm of scenarios which could be regarded as feasible. 
Figure 4: TIP curve of scenario halving poverty gap and headcount ratio  
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Table 6 summarises whether the targets of halving the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty 
gap could be met under a range of growth/distribution scenarios.23 The effects of GDP growth 
through to 2014 at averages of 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, and 7% per annum are considered. These 
growth rates are shown here combined with four different pro-poor distributional scenarios. 
Following the method described earlier, in the most ‘intensive’ distributional change the 
maximum gain is R300 per month, which benefits the very poorest person, with the gains 
decreasing from there. In the least ‘intensive’ distribution scenario shown here, the lowest-
expenditure person gains by only R50 per month; intermediate scenarios of R100 and R200 are 
                                                 
23
 While Table 6 summarises the results in terms of expenditure, in terms of income the only difference is that 
under the scenario of 4% growth with a maximum distributional gain of R200 per month it is only the poverty gap 
that is halved, not the poverty gap and headcount ratio as shown in the table. 
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also shown. The results shown here are for distributional changes revolving around the 66.6 th 
percentile. 
For each scenario Table 6 indicates whether or not the target of halving poverty is met. Since 
we are considering the halving of poverty in terms of halving both the poverty headcount ratio 
and the poverty gap, in each scenario an ‘H’ indicates that the poverty headcount ratio is (at 
least) halved while a ‘G’ indicates that the poverty gap is (at least) halved. The ten scenarios in 
which both dimensions of poverty are halved are shaded in. 
Of course, the higher the growth rate, the less of a distributional change is required to meet the 
target of halving poverty, and vice versa. However, even under a highly optimistic (in all 
probability unrealistic) scenario of 7% annual growth through to 2014, the poverty headcount 
ratio cannot be halved without some distributional change.   
Table 6: Meeting of poverty targets under alternative growth/distribution scenarios 
 Distribution 
 R300 R200 R100 R50 None 
Growth      
7% H, G H, G H, G  - ,G  - ,G 
6% H, G H, G  - ,G  - ,G  - ,G 
5% H, G H, G  - ,G  - ,G  -, - 
4% H, G H ,G  - ,G  -, -  -, - 
3% H, G  - ,G  - ,G   -, -  -, - 
Notes: 
Growth refers to the average annualised growth rate between 2006 and 2014 under the various scenarios. 
Distribution refers to the distribution scenarios as set out in the text. R300 means that the expenditure of the 
lowest-income person is R300 per month higher than it would otherwise have been (with amounts decreasing 
from there as income rises); similarly for R200, R100, and R50. 
For each scenario (growth/distribution combination), H means that the poverty headcount ratio is at least halved 
and G indicates that the poverty gap is at least halved;  – means that those measures are not halved. 
 
Table 7 shows what inequality of expenditure (household per capita) would look like under 
some of these growth/distributional scenarios. The figures shown here for the effects of 
distributional change are for distributional change around the 66.6 th percentile as discussed 
above, i.e. relative gains to the bottom two thirds of the distribution and relative losses to the 
upper third; these would differ somewhat if we use for example the median or the 75th 
percentile. The Gini coefficient of the current distribution of expenditure is 0.67, and without 
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any distributional change this would of course remain the same irrespective of the growth 
rate.24 
Before considering growth, the last row of the table shows how much the Gini would be 
brought down to under each of the distributional scenarios. Distributional change in which the 
poorest person gains an additional R50 per month, with decreasing gains for each person as we 
move up the distribution, would already cut the Gini to 0.65. The most intensive distributional 
change which we model here, in which the poorest person gains an additional R300 per month, 
would bring the Gini down to 0.56. While this level of inequality would be a significant 
improvement on current levels, it would still be extremely high by international standards, 
bringing South Africa to about the current level of inequality in Brazil. 
Table 7: Inequality under alternative growth/distribution scenarios 
 Distribution 
 R300 R200 R100 R50 None 
Growth      
7% 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.67 
6% 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.67 
5% 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.67 
4% 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.67 
3% 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.67 
- 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.67 
Note: Expenditure inequality, measured with Gini coefficient 
. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Some important conclusions can be drawn from these scenarios concerning the meeting of the 
AsgiSA poverty target, and possible policy implications thereof. 
                                                 
24
 The only reason why the Gini varies across growth rates under a given distributional scenario is that we 
implemented the distributional changes after applying the growth rates, so that the value of a distributional 
change differs relative to the post-growth income or expenditure values. Had the distributional changes been 
applied prior to the respective growth rates, the Gini would be constant for any given distributional scenario, 
irrespective of the growth rate. However, this would mean that the scale of the distributional change would not be 
identical for any given distributional scenario, as the growth would also affect the size of the effective 
distributional change, e.g. the poorest person would gain not just R300 under the ‘R300’ distributional scenario, 
but R300 inflated by a growth rate, cumulative over the eight year period. 
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Firstly, the target of halving poverty by 2014 does appear to be feasible, under growth rates 
that are a bit lower than in recent years and with quite mild distributional change. It might be 
suggested therefore that this target should not be given up upon or treated as some distant 
goal or rhetorical aspiration. This is reinforced by the fact that the entire poverty gap in South 
Africa (using the poverty line specified here) is just 3% of GDP. 
Secondly, however, it is highly improbable that the AsgiSA poverty reduction target will be 
attained in the absence of a pro-poor shift in the growth trajectory. Growth alone will not 
enable the halving of poverty. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the growth path would 
endogenously evolve in a sufficiently pro-poor way, without active policy interventions 
designed to achieve this shift. 
Thirdly, these scenarios warn that any worsening of inequality will make the meeting of the 
AsgiSA poverty targets virtually impossible. Specifically, should distribution worsen for the 
bottom half of the population, improbably high growth rates would be needed to halve poverty 
by 2014. Given that income and expenditure include non-earnings sources, economic growth 
would in itself not necessarily be distributionally neutral in the absence of policy measures to 
ensure that the unemployed also benefit. Growth which failed to carry along those in the lower 
part of the distribution would not even have the poverty-reducing effects shown earlier for 
growth alone. South Africa thus cannot afford any worsening of inequality if poverty is to be 
halved by 2014. 
Fourthly, given that government is still finalising the level of the national poverty line, the 
possible temptation for policymakers to set this too low should be avoided. It currently appears 
that, notwithstanding the background research by Stats SA into the minimum amount which 
could be used for a poverty line, government is considering setting it even lower than this level. 
This might be motivated at least in part by the realisation of just how many people would fall 
under such a line, and perhaps a concern that it would be difficult to halve that number of 
people within a reasonable timeframe. One insight that emerges from this analysis is that even 
middling growth with no distributional change goes a long way towards halving of poverty by 
2014, and with what might be considered fairly mild pro-poor distributional change the halving 
of poverty appears to be feasible. While a poverty line in the region of R450 [$67] per capita per 
 26 
month (as used in this analysis) means that about half of all South Africans would currently be 
classified as poor, this should not necessarily motivate the choice of a lower poverty line given 
the feasibility of dramatically cutting poverty over the next few years.25  
While decent rates of growth could make some inroads into poverty, given the scale of poverty 
growth alone will fall short. Particularly if growth rates fall in South Africa over the next few 
years, more intensive distributional change would be required in order to halve poverty. The 
sustainability of the current growth path is also questionable even in its own terms, but that is 
another matter.  
Given South Africa’s levels of income per capita and status as an upper-middle income country, 
the scale of poverty that we are faced with is associated more with distributional patterns than 
with the total amount of resources available. Poverty in South Africa would be far lower than it 
is, were distribution to be at anything approaching a typical level of inequality by international 
standards. But inequality in South Africa is extreme by international standards. Higher growth 
would lift people out of poverty (unless that growth is actually immiserising, for instance if 
there were a shift towards an even more capital-intensive and exclusive growth path). 
However, when South Africa is considered in a global context the primary explanation for our 
high levels of poverty lies in the country’s distributional structure.  
The simulations of the effects of various growth/distributional scenarios suggest that halving 
poverty by 2014 requires a ‘pro-poor’ shift in the growth trajectory (over and above the 
distributional policies currently in place), such that distribution becomes less unequal. 
Conversely, any worsening of inequality will put the AsgiSA poverty reduction targets beyond 
reach. 
Distributional changes would of course not in practice materialise in the manner modelled here, 
but these simulations are indicative of the scale of distributional changes needed to halve 
poverty. The most important dynamic underlying actual distributional changes is likely to be 
through the labour market, in terms of both employment creation (or losses) and the 
                                                 
25
 Nonetheless, the method developed here could be applied to the analysis of poverty using alternative poverty 
lines, and could indicate how poverty rates could be affected by various growth rates or distributional changes 
using any monetary poverty lines. 
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distribution of earnings amongst the employed. Social spending certainly has a role to play in 
ameliorating inequality and poverty, particularly in the short-medium term. However, South 
Africa’s inequality is unlikely to be brought down to ‘decent’ levels – at least to ‘normal’ 
standards of inequality internationally – through social spending, but rather through increased 
demand for low- and semi-skilled labour and through a closing of wage gaps. 
Dramatic improvements in distribution rarely come about without active measures targeted 
specifically at lessening inequality. Moderate decreases in inequality may well come about as a 
by-product of other dynamics. However, the magnitude of the reduction in inequality that 
would be required to bring South Africa anywhere in line with international norms is 
realistically not going to happen without policies dedicated to that end. The distributional 
changes analysed here would not even bring South Africa down to typical levels of inequality 
for a middle-income country, but to the range of highly unequal countries such as Brazil. 
A stylised fact of distributional changes internationally, at least in recent decades, is what we 
might term a ‘downward stickiness’ of inequality.26 Increases in inequality are much less 
reversible than are decreases. For instance, in countries where a government has come into 
power which instituted conservative economic policies that worsened income distribution, 
followed by the election of a government that switched to more ‘progressive’ policies, the 
distribution of income typically hardly comes down and certainly not down to the initial levels. 
Even where the intention is genuinely to improve income distribution, this often turns out to be 
far more difficult than anticipated. This is not surprising, as the wealthy are generally far better 
able to protect their income than are the poor, as well as being better placed to reverse any 
‘unfavourable’ changes in distribution that do occur. This asymmetry in distributional changes 
underlines the point that a significant improvement in income distribution is highly unlikely to 
materialise without strong policy interventions geared towards that goal. Improving income 
distribution is possible, but it takes effort. 
With the poverty line as defined here, the aggregate poverty gap is only about 3% of GDP. This 
suggests that poverty in South Africa should not be viewed as an insurmountable problem. In 
                                                 
26
 See Palma (2007). 
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fact, given that half of the population falls below that line, 3% of GDP is a comparatively small 
amount, and is smaller than what might have been expected before analysing the data. Of 
course the actual cost of eliminating poverty would significantly exceed this amount if 
considered in terms of direct transfers (given issues of targeting and administration).  
Nonetheless, considering the huge scale of poverty in terms of its incidence, in conjunction with 
the rather small scale when considered in terms of GDP, does suggest the feasibility of dramatic 
reductions in poverty. If this proves intractable through a shift in the growth path, direct 
transfers could prove effective (as they have been in the case of Brazil). The extreme levels of 
inequality in South Africa would seem to suggest that there is considerable scope for pro-poor 
distributional change. 
In this vein it might be suggested that the reduction of inequality be placed as a more central 
and explicit goal of government policy than is currently the case, both for its own sake and in 
order to significantly reduce poverty. Whether the reduction of inequality is a desirable goal in 
its own right is obviously a political issue. An associated consideration, if indeed the reduction 
of inequality is a public policy objective, is how strongly and in what ways this is to be pursued 
insofar as there are tensions between this and other policy goals.  
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APPENDIX 1: TIP CURVE USING FOOD POVERTY LINE 
For comparison purposes, Figure A1 shows the TIP curve using the food poverty line (set at 
R295 [$44] per capita per month). Using this lower line means that the poverty headcount ratio 
is significantly lower, at around 34% of the population. Furthermore, the poverty gap is 
significantly lower, just about R36 per capita per month when averaged over the entire 
population. The dotted horizontal and vertical lines show what the targets for halving the 
poverty gap and headcount ratio respectively if the food poverty line is used. 
Figure A1: TIP curve of expenditure, using food poverty line 
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Notes: 
Food poverty line set at R295 [$44], as discussed in the main text. 
A different scale is used in this case as from the other TIP curves (in Figures 1-4). 
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APPENDIX 2: METHOD USED FOR SIMULATING DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGES 
To set out the method described in section 4 more formally, let xi  denote the income or 
expenditure of person i where the population is ranked from lowest to highest in terms of 
variable x, for i = 1,2,…,n. That is, x1 is the lowest income or expenditure and xn the highest. 
Note that this ranking will differ for income and for expenditure. In this analysis, n = 47 391 192. 
Select ρ , the point around which the distributional change will revolve. For symmetrical 
distributional change around the median, n5.0=ρ ; for distributional change around the person 
at for example the 75th percentile, n75.0=ρ . 
Let iθ  be the value of the distributional change affecting person i such that: 
0i >θ  for ρ<i ; 
0i <θ  for ρ>i ; and 
0i =θ  for ρ=i . 
Select ω , the value of the gain to the person with the lowest income or expenditure [i=1].  
The range of values to be redistributed will be:  
φθω ≤≤ i  where φ  is the maximum loss to the person with the highest income or 
expenditure [i=n] and 0>ω and 0<φ . 
For the special case of distributional change revolving around the median ( n5.0=ρ ), 
φω −= ; 
while for distributional change around points higher than the median (e.g. n75.0=ρ ),  
φω < . 
Then for ρ<i : 
1
)i(
1
)1i(
i
−
−
=
−
−
−=
ρ
ρω
ρ
ω
ωθ . 
Such that for ρ>i : 
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Note that in this exposition we have selected the maximum gain to the person with the lowest 
income or expenditure [i=1], ω , then calculated the gain to the other people in subset ρ<i ; 
this allowed for the derivation of the loss to the people in subset ρ<i . We could equally have 
begun by selecting the loss to the person with the highest income or expenditure [i=n], φ , and 
calculating ρθ >∀ ii  and thence deriving ρθ <∀ ii ; the results would be identical.  
The post-distributional-change income of person i will thus be: 
iii xx θ+=~    
Such that 
.
~;~;~ ρρρ >∀<==<∀> ixxandiforxxixx iiiiii  
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